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Abstract
This study compares the duration of new job matches in the east and west
German labour market that formed between the start of the German Economic,
Monetary and Social Union in July 1990 and December 2000. The study relies on
job duration data drawn from the German Socio-economic Panel. It shows with
non-parametric duration methods that job matches are less stable in east than in
west Germany. However, this is not the case in the first years of the transition
process, in which most likely the more profitable jobs were created and the best
job matches were formed. Results form the non-parametric analysis but also from
a proportional hazards model that controls for important covariates imply that
the transition rates into alternative jobs and into unemployment vary with tenure
in a way, which is in line with predictions of theories of job mobility such as the
job specific capital hypothesis and matching theories.
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1 Introduction
Labour markets after the transition shock were subject to a large reallocation of labour.
Old job matches disappeared very quickly in economies in transition, while many new
job matches were created.1 But are these new job matches as stable as in comparable
non-transition countries?
This paper analysis the duration of new job matches in east and west Germany. The
observation period starts in July 1990, at the start of the German Economic, Monetary
and Social Union. This event introduced the west German economic framework in east
Germany. I investigate whether in east Germany new job matches end up more or
less rapidly by a job change or by unemployment rather than in west Germany. The
job duration data is drawn from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) over the
period from July 1990 to December 2000. The econometric analysis applies both non-
parametric duration methods as well as a discrete-time proportional hazards model with
gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity. The latter model quantifies the impact of
important covariates on variation of the hazards into other jobs and into unemployment.
There are general hypotheses on job duration that I investigate. Farber (1999) discussed
these hypotheses: Job specific capital has a value only on the job but loses its value after
a job change (see Jovanovic, 1979a). The cost of searching for a new job and replacing a
worker who leaves the firm, skills that are only useful on the specific job and information
about the quality of the employer-worker match are regarded as such job specific capital.
The more such capital has been accumulated the lower the separation rates, thus they
are declining in tenure. As far as match quality is concerned the prediction is somewhat
but not entirely different (e.g., see Jovanovic, 1979b). Initially the match quality is
uncertain. With more and more tenure, and thus additional information about the
match, the worker and the employer update their beliefs about the match quality.
Separation rates first rise, as some job matches turn out to be of relatively low quality.
There is a sorting effect though: The longer tenure, the higher the share of high quality
job matches and the lower the empirical separation rates.
A decline in the empirical separation rates with tenure could be purely a result of
heterogeneity: Some workers are characterised by high job mobility, others by a low
one. This is the mover-stayer hypothesis of Blumen, Kogen, and McCarthy (1955). If it
is true, we have a spurious negative duration dependence of the hazards, which is hence
no evidence for the hypotheses of the theories of job mobility. I will use models that
account for unobserved heterogeneity and control for a worker’s recent job mobility, to
avoid such a spurious dependence of separation rates on tenure.
For east Germany as a transition economy a number of additional hypotheses are of
interest. First, given the rapid restructuring of the economy, new job matches may be
quite unstable for various reasons. One of them is that old and new firms operate in a
new environment. In contrast to a non-transition country, there is a higher uncertainty
about whether their activities and hence job matches will be profitable. A larger share
of the new job matches in east in contrast to west Germany could turn out to be unprof-
itable. Another reason to observe relatively unstable jobs in a transition country is the
creation of many jobs in public work programs. Such jobs are directed to unemployed
people and are time limited, so that high separation rates are a likely outcome.
1E.g., see Wolff and Tru¨bswetter (2003) for the east German labour market and Jurajdy and Terrell
(2002) for the labour markets in the Czech Republic and Estonia.
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An additional hypothesis is that at the start of the transition process the most produc-
tive new firms and jobs were set up and matched to the most productive workers. I.e.,
new job matches were of very high quality in the first few years of the transition process
but of lower quality later on. Thus, job matches that started early in the transition
process are the most stable ones.
Initially, east German wages adjusted rapidly towards west German levels.2 In turn, to
achieve gains in labour productivity, firms had to substitute capital and skilled labour
for unskilled labour. Thus new jobs of unskilled workers were presumably much less
stable than those of skilled workers.
A study on east German job mobility of Solga, Diewald, and Goedicke (2000) showed
that in a first phase of the transition process, from January 1990 to June 1992, there
were high monthly rates of job-change both between firms and within firms. These
transition rates were only about half as high in a second phase from July 1992 to March
1996. Their analysis relied on a life course study for east Germany, that collected data
on the birth cohorts from 1939-41, 1951-53 and 1959-61. It was restricted to people who
were employed in December 1989. Their unit of observation was any job match that
was in course over their observation period. Thus, they did not focus on the duration
of new jobs in the east German labour market or a comparison to the west German job
duration. In this paper I will focus on such issues.
Section 2 discusses the data from the GSOEP. It emphasizes advantages and disad-
vantages of these data compared with alternative data sets. It also provides an order
of magnitude of the importance of employer and within-firm changes in the east and
west German economy over the observation period. Section 3 discusses the econometric
methods. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics on the job spell sample. It highlights
the main hypotheses on job duration. It then discusses whether results from a non-
parametric analysis of the data are in line with these hypotheses. The main estimation
results of the discrete-time proportional hazards model are discussed in Section 5. The
exit states I consider are both job change and unemployment. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 The German Socio-economic Panel and other data
There are various data sources for studying job duration in Germany.3 One source of
data are the “Regional Files” of the Institute for Employment Research, which stem
from social security records.4 Individuals were sampled with a probability of one per-
cent, so that a large number of observations are available. But these data are only
available until 1997. Moreover, for east Germany, they are only available from 1992
onwards. Therefore, with these data one cannot study job duration at the start of the
transition process and by the end of the 1990s.
Another data source is an east German life history study that was conducted by the
Max-Planck Institute for Human Development (Berlin). Solga, Diewald, and Goedicke
2Hunt (2001) estimated with data from the GSOEP that the median wage of east German workers
aged 18 to 54 rose by 83 % in the first six years after the introduction of the German Economic,
Monetary and Social Union.
3Except for the GSOEP, public use files of the other data sources mentioned in this section are
available at the “Central Archive for Empirical Social Research”, University of Cologne.
4For a detailed description of these data see Haas (2001).
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(2000) used these data in their study on east German labour market dynamics. They
contain information on the labour force status and events like job changes of a number
of birth cohorts from the start of 1990 until the start of 1996. But this information
was retrospectively collected. The respondents had to recall job events over this time
horizon at their interviews in 1996 or 1997. Severe recall errors with respect to events
at the start of the transition process may be the consequence. Finally, the data provide
little information on the second half of the 1990s. This also applies to a further possible
data source, the Labor Force Monitor, which was a labour survey carried out in east
Germany from November 1990 to November 1994.
The GSOEP, in contrast, provides information on job duration in east and west Ger-
many from July 1990 until the start of the year 2002.5 In east Germany, this panel
study was first carried out in June 1990, when 2,200 households responded. In west
Germany it already started in 1984, carrying out successful interviews in more than
5,900 households. The panel study was expanded by refresher samples: In the wave of
1998 more than 1,000 households were added. More than 6,000 additional households
were interviewed in the wave of the year 2000. The GSOEP provides information on a
large number of individual and household characteristics.
2.2 Information on job duration
Several questions of the GSOEP allow to construct the duration of jobs measured in
months. Employed respondents state whether and in which month their job started
since the beginning of the last calendar year. The interviews usually take place in late
winter or early spring, so that information on job events in the first months of the
year are available. The respondents also choose between several job events: First job,
new employer, self-employment, change within the firm, company takeover or return to
work. Until 1993 only people who already responded at least once to the GSOEP had
to answer these questions. Thereafter, it was relevant to all respondents. In a separate
question, before 1994, all people who responded to the GSOEP for the first time were
asked the calendar year and calendar month of the job start at their current employer.
But they did not have to state the exact event that led to the job start. For these
individuals the answer to this question defines the relevant job start.
Another important piece of information is the calendar end of the job. In each wave
respondents state in which calendar month of the last year or of the current year a job
was terminated. They also report for how many years and how many months this job
lasted. To construct job spells, I combine the information on job starts of jobs held
currently with the information on the job end that is provided in subsequent waves.
But this job start information is only available if at the interview a respondent still
works in the job. Thus, we get a stock sample that overrepresents long job spells.
For a random sample of job duration, jobs that start and end between two subsequent
interviews are needed. These jobs are observable due to the information provided on
the end and duration of the last job. Of course if a respondent starts and terminates
more than one job spell between the interviews of two subsequent waves, one can only
observe the most recent spell. Note that for these spells, job attributes like firm size
and sector are not available. They are only collected for jobs that are in course at the
5The estimation was carried out before the release of the most recent wave of the GSOEP. So only
information until the wave of 2001 is used in the analysis.
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respondent’s interview. This is major disadvantage of these data.
By what type of exit the job matches are completed is determined in various ways. If
a job spell of an individual immediately starts after the end of a previous job spell, it
will be coded as a job change. Whether a job terminates by an exit into unemployment
or non-participation, can be determined by the information from the monthly labour
status calendarium of the GSOEP.6
A number of job spells in the sample can be followed from their start until some calendar
month but not until they terminate. Such right-censored spells exist for several reasons:
Respondents temporarily or permanently drop out of the panel study, before their job
ends. Moreover, some respondents claim in one wave to still hold their job but that
they are jobless in the subsequent wave without reporting a job end. Such job spells
are right-censored at the length that they reached at the previous wave’s interview. Job
spells are also right-censored if they reach the end of the observation period (December
2000).7 Finally, I treat job spells as right-censored at 48 months if they last for longer.
For the analysis, I will use information of the waves from 1990 to 2001 of the GSOEP,
including observations from the refresher samples. The analysis excludes foreigners
as the GSOEP-East only collected information on households with German household
heads. Further I will restrict the samples to men who are not older than 65 years and
women who are not older than 60 years.
2.3 Employment, employer changes and within-firm job changes
I first provide some descriptive statistics of the east Germany labour market in tran-
sition. I focus on employment and job changes. Figure 1 shows the development of
real gross domestic product (GDP), employment and GDP per worker from the year
1989 until the year 1998; thereafter GDP figures for west and east Germany are no
longer available, separately. The important facts are however captured by the time
series presented in the figure.
Figure 1 displays the initial decline of GDP. It fell more rapidly than employment and
reached its trough in 1991 at about 65 % its 1989 level. In the following four years GDP
grew strongly by about 8 to 10 %. Between 1995 and 1998 though, its annual growth
rate was less than three percent. Thereafter, the it became even lower. The GDP of
the east German federal states excluding Berlin rose by about −0.1 to 2 % from 1999
to 2002 (see German Institute for Economic Research, 2002, Table 3.2).
The east German employment stock declined immensely between 1989 and 1992. The
average employment stock in the latter year was about 65 % of that in 1989. From 1992
to 1998 employment decreased to 63 % the employment stock in 1989. Since then, it is
relatively constant (see German Institute for Economic Research, 2002, Table 3.9).
The adjustment of the employment stock tells us very little about the extent at which
new job matches formed. Therefore, I turn to another set of statistics, the share of
6Sometimes such a job change is recorded but the monthly labour force status information shows
that the person is not employed after the job end. Such cases are not treated as a job change but as
right-censored at the observed end for analysing the job change hazard. They are treated as an exit in
the non-parametric analysis of the survival probability, as for this analysis any type of exit is relevant.
7The last available wave when the sample was drawn was the wave of 2001. Retrospective informa-
tion on unemployment or non-participation as exit states was only available until December 2000. So
the observation period ends in this month.
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jobs in the employment stock that are due to job starts at a new employer or within-
firm job changes. These statistics are computed from information of the GSOEP. In
the computation, I used appropriate sampling weights provided by the GSOEP. I will
consider a sub-sample of individuals which is aged 16 to 65 years for men and 16 to
60 years for women.8 Note, that I include only people who also responded in the wave
prior to the one for which the following statistics are computed. The reason is that
before 1994 the question on new employer worker matches and within-firm job changes
was only addressed to people who were already interviewed in the past.
Figure 1
Employment, gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP per worker
during the east German transition process (1989 = 100)
Calendar time
 Employment  GDP, const. prices
 GDP per worker, const. prices
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
60
80
100
120
140
160
Source: National Accounts, German Institute for Economic Research
Figure 2 presents the number of men who started a job at a new employer since the
previous wave’s interview relative to the male employment stock at the current wave’s
interview.9 The interviews usually take place between February and April so that nearly
all statistics displayed in these figures are roughly on an annual basis. Only for the wave
of 1991 the shares are computed for jobs that started after June 1990 as the main tran-
sition shock began with the start of the German Economic, Monetary and Social Union
in July 1990. I excluded from the employment stock people who reported marginal
employment or vocational training as their labour force status. Finally the statistics
are displayed for residents in east or west Germany. That is east German respondents
who had migrated to the west and vice versa are excluded from the analysis.10
8The number of observations available for this calculation are presented in Table A1 of the Appendix.
9This analysis includes no job starts that are due to workers returning to their employer, first jobs
or self-employment. The reason is that I want to show to what extent new job matches formed between
an employer and a worker who previously worked for a different employer.
10Of the sample under consideration, employed people, less than one percent of the respondents to
the GSOEP-East lived in west Germany in 1991. But this percentage increased considerably. In 1992
it was already 2.5 % and in 1994 more than four percent. In the years that follow this percentage rose
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Figure 2
Jobs at a new employer as a share of the employment stock - Mena
Sh
ar
e
Calendar time
 west Germany  east Germany
    
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
.02
.04
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.08
.1
.12
.14
.16
.18
aMen aged 16 to 65 years
Figure 2 suggests three stylized facts. There is a first period of rapid labour reallocation
from July 1990 to spring 1992 in east Germany. In 1991 and 1992 the share of new
employer-worker matches in the employment stock was more than 14 % in the east but
only 6.5 and 5.6 % in the west. Then follows a second period from 1992 until 1997 where
the labour reallocation in the east is still somewhat and significantly higher than in the
west: The share of new jobs in the east German employment stock ranges from 9.2 to
11.8 %, while for west Germany it is roughly five percentage points lower. Since 1998
the east and west German shares of new employer-worker matches are very similar.
Figure 3 displays the same statistics for women and demonstrates three stylized facts.
First, the share of jobs at new employers in west Germany is quite stable ranging from
5.5 to 8.4 %. Second, in the east from 1991 until 1995 the shares are often significantly
higher than in the west and the difference ranges from 2.1 to 6.1 percentage points.
Third, already from 1996 onwards, the shares of new employer-worker matches of the
two regions are similar. The exception is the year 1999, where the west German share
is about twice the east German one. So for women, the rapid reallocation of labour
during the transition process ended earlier than for men.
The share of within-firm job changes in the current employment stock is displayed in
Figure 4 for men and Figure 5 for women. Only in the very first years of the transition
process the share of within-firm job changes is higher in east than in west Germany.11
In east Germany the share is about five percent for men and 5.7 % for women in 1991,
which covers within-firm job change for from July 1990 to March/April 1991. The
more slowly and reached about 10.5 % by 2001. For respondents to the GSOEP-West, the percentage
of people who live in east Germany is below one percent.
11The sample of east German women in the year 1993 excludes one respondent who experienced a
within-firm job change, but is characterised by an extremely high sample weight that is more than 14
times the average weight of this sample.
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Figure 3
Jobs at a new employer as a share of the employment stock - Womena
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Figure 4
Within-firm job changes as a share of the employment stock - Mena
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aMen aged 16 to 60 years
corresponding numbers for the west are below two percent. In spring 1992 the east
German shares still exceed the west German ones. But the differences are no longer
significant according to the 95 % confidence bands. In most of the years that follow,
the two regions differ little in their share of within-firm job changes.
Hence, for the reallocation of labour in east Germany, within-firm job changes played
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Figure 5
Within-firm job changes as a share of the employment stock - Womena
Sh
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aWomen aged 16 to 60 years
a considerable role only very early in the transition process. There are two important
reasons for this. First, when the transition process started the old firms tried to improve
their efficiency as quickly as possible by reallocating labour within the firm. Second,
at the start of the transition process, many firms were subject to agreements between
unions and employer federations on temporary protection against dismissal.12 Therefore
they were also constrained to use within-firm job changes to fill open positions.
3 Econometric methods - the discrete-time proportional hazards model
Let T be the random variable duration of a job match (tenure) and J be the destination
state like new/alternative job. The transition rate from the job into another destination
for a small duration interval [t, t+∆t[ is defined as
θj(t|x(t)) = lim
∆t→0
P (t ≤ T < t+∆t|T ≥ t, J = j,x(t)),
∆t
, j = 1, ...,M (1)
where x(t) represents a vector of covariates that may vary over the spell length and
there are M different destination states.13 In the Cox Proportional Hazards model (see
Cox, 1972) it is specified as
θj(t|x(t)) = θj0(t) · exp(x(t)′βj), (2)
where θj0(t), the baseline hazard, represents variation of the transition rate with the
spell length and hence the duration dependence pattern. βj represents the destination
12The most important agreement was the one of the metal industry and electrical engineering. It
affected more than a quarter of the total employment stock and was in force until the end of June
1991.
13Provided that exit to such destination states is independent, the sum over all destination state
specific hazards gives the hazard from the job into any destination state.
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specific parameter vector of the covariates. This specification of the hazard is adequate
when the spell length is measured in continuous time, e.g., when duration is measured
in days. In this study duration is measured in months, so the unit of measurement is
rather discrete. Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) present the discrete-time formulation of
the proportional hazard rate model; the resulting discrete-time hazard is
hj(t|x(t)) = 1− exp[− exp(γjt + x(t)′βj)], (3)
where γjt =
∫ t+1
t
θj0(τ)dτ.
This hazard is the probability that the exit occurs during month t, provided that the
job match lasted until the start of that month. So it is a conditional probability. The
probability of survival, i.e., of remaining on the job up to the start of the monthly
interval t is then
S(t|x(t− 1), ...,x(0)) =
t−1∏
τ=0
[
1−
M∑
j=1
hj(τ |x(τ)
]
. (4)
This specification assumes that covariates do not change their value during a monthly
interval, but they may change from month to month. The resulting parameters of
the baseline hazard, γjt, may either be specified by a parametric function of duration
or non-parametrically, e.g., as distinct parameters for each monthly interval of spell
length that is available in the data.14 Spells that end with an exit contribute to the
likelihood function with their hazard times the probability of survival. Spells that are
right-censored, i.e., where by the observed end of a spell no exit did occur, contribute
to the likelihood function only by their survival probability.
The formulation of the transition rate above does not consider unobserved heterogene-
ity which determines the hazard rates, but at the same time is independent of the
covariates. Neglecting such heterogeneity tends to bias duration dependence towards
a negative duration dependence pattern. Moreover, for the case of gamma-distributed
unobserved heterogeneity the response of the hazard to a covariate will become lower
than its true value (see Lancaster, 1990, p.67). In the following specification unobserved
heterogeneity, v, is assumed to be multiplicative
hj(t|x(t), v) = 1− exp[− exp[γjt + x(t)′βj + ln(v)]]. (5)
Following Meyer (1990) the unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be gamma-distributed
with expectation, E(v) = 1, and a constant variance, V (v) = σ2v . The likelihood func-
tion for this case may be found in Meyer (1990) or Hujer and Schneider (1995).15 If
there is more than one potential exit state (competing-risks), provided that the risks
are independent, the parameters of a transition rate to a specific exit state may be
estimated by maximizing the likelihood of a single-risk model. In this case spells that
end by an exit to another state are treated as right-censored and contribute to the
likelihood function by the probability of survival at the observed spell length.
14Models with such a piece-wise constant baseline hazards are referred to as semi-parametric duration
models.
15Maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters of the discrete-time proportional hazards model
with gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity can be carried out in STATA using the “pgmhaz”
procedure written by Stephen Jenkins (see Jenkins, 1997).
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4 New jobs matches and their duration: Non-parametric analysis
4.1 The spell sample
This section presents a first descriptive analysis of the duration of new job matches or
tenure. When I refer to observations as a job spell, I intend the duration of a job match.
Of course the job may still exist once a worker leaves it. I use an inflow sample into
such new jobs matches for east and west Germany over the period from July 1990 to
December 2000. The job spell information was computed as described in Section 2.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on these job spells for east and west Germany
and by gender. There are about 8,700 new jobs in the west German sample and nearly
6,550 in the east German one. Job starts of men make up for 50 % of the west German
sample and about 55 % of the east German one. The second row shows the share
of right-censored spells in the samples, which is about 0.65 for the west and at 0.57
somewhat lower for the east.
Table 1
Share of exit, completed and right-censored spells
west Germany east Germany
Total Men Women Total Men Women
Number of spells 8,684 4,350 4,334 6,542 3,596 2,946
Right-censored spells 0.654 0.653 0.655 0.574 0.570 0.577
Completed spells 0.346 0.347 0.345 0.426 0.430 0.423
Exit into:
Other job (job change) 0.164 0.179 0.149 0.134 0.154 0.110
Unemployment 0.088 0.097 0.078 0.232 0.224 0.241
Other 0.094 0.071 0.118 0.061 0.051 0.072
Median duration (months) 38 41 35 32 32 32
Survival prob. (12 months or more) 0.772 0.771 0.773 0.725 0.718 0.733
Table 1 also shows the share of spells that end by a job change, unemployment or any
other labour force state (non-participation).16 The destination new job are exits where
by the end of a job another job start is recorded and includes within-firm job changes.
For the west roughly 18 % of male and 15 % of female job matches end by a job change.
These shares are somewhat lower for the east at 15.4 and 11 % respectively. Of the west
German sample 9.7 % of men and 7.8 % of women exit into unemployment. The east
German numbers are much higher at 22.4 % for men and 24.1 % for women. Except for
west German women, other labour force states are the least important type of exit.17
16The bulk of these job spells are completed due to a reported job end. However, there are some
exceptions, where no job end was reported. One reason is that I define a job spell as completed if there
is a within-firm job change. This is though provided by a question on the job starts and determines the
end of about five percent of the completed job spells. When the job end is not reported, the job length
can be observed only until some wave’s interview. Yet in some of these cases, retrospective labour
force status of the subsequent wave on the start of non-employment spells suggest that such a job
indeed ended at that point in time. This is the case for little more than six percent of the completed
spells. Similarly eight percent of the completed job ends are determined by job start information of the
subsequent wave that suggests, that a new job started just in the month were a job spell was originally
right-censored as no job termination was reported.
17The exit category “other” aggregates a number of very heterogeneous destination states. For men
in west Germany the most important destination state is school or university at about 32 % of these
exits. The categories “other labour force state” makes up for another 14 %, vocational training for
10
The final two rows of the Table 1 show life-table estimates of the median duration and
the probability of staying in the job for at least 12 months.18 They provide a first
impression of how stable jobs are. For the west German sample the median duration is
38 months, while for the east German one it is somewhat lower at 32 months. 77 % of
the jobs in west Germany last for at least one year, as opposed to only about 72 % in
east Germany. While in the east the median job duration of both gender is the same,
in the west at 41 months for men it is six months higher than for women.
In how far are the job separations quits or dismissals? Respondents to the GSOEP
provide a reason for a job end. The question on this topic changed in the wave of 1999.
Respondents got the additional option whether the job separation is due to a mutual
agreement between employer and employee. According to the wave of 1999 more than
ten percent of job terminations were due to this reason. Before they would most likely
been reported as either a quit or a dismissal. Additionally, in contrast to the previous
waves, in 1999 and 2000, the option “company closed down” was not available. Hence, I
will discuss the reason for a job end for the waves prior to 1999. Given the retrospective
character of the corresponding question, only job ends prior to 1998 are regarded.
Table 2 shows the number of job ends in this subsample and shares of different reasons
for the job end. For each region there are more than 1,900 job terminations. For roughly
24 % of these in the west and about 20 % in the east no reason for the job end could
be determined.19 I distinguish between seven reasons for the end of a job: Company
closed down, a temporary contract ends, dismissal, quits, change within the company,
on leave, and any other reason. Quits are the modal reason for the west German sample
at 26 %. The next two important reasons are end of a temporary contract and dismissal,
at 13.1 and 12.6 % respectively. Naturally, that a company closed down is similar to a
dismissal. For this reason 4.5 % of the west German jobs end.
The numbers for east Germany differ somewhat from the west German ones. The per-
centage of terminations of a temporary contract is at more than 20 % much higher than
in west Germany. Moreover, dismissal at about 22 % is the modal reason for a job end
and 9.5 % of the jobs ended because a company closed down. In the depressed labour
market of a transition economy, quits at 16.5 % are less important than dismissals.
roughly 13 % and military or community service for about 12 % of the exits labelled as other. In east
Germany about 19 % of the male exits are into military or community service. Another 17.5 % are
directed into retirement, about 17 % into vocational training, 13 % into “other labour force state” and
10.5 % into school or university. For women the dominant exit states within the category “other” differ
from those of men. Among the female respondents with the destination labelled as “other”, in west
Germany more than 32 % become housewives, 26 % are on maternity leave, while ten percent go to
school or university, nine percent responded “other labour force state” and 8.5 % vocational training.
In east Germany about 24 % are on maternity leave, more than 16 % in vocational training, 14 %
reported housewife, ten percent go to school or university and another nine percent reported “other
labour force state”.
18For the life-table estimator see Blossfeld, Hamerle, and Mayer (1989).
19There are various reasons why the job end information is not available: A non-response is the reason
in about 11 % of the cases. In 26 % of these missing cases a within-firm job change was provided by
the job start information and indicated a job change, but no job end was reported. For another 23 %
of the missing values no job end was reported and these were right-censored job spells at the interview
of the wave, were the job was observed for the last time. But the retrospective labour force status
information of the subsequent wave suggested that these censored job spells were immediately followed
by a non-employment spell. Therefore they were coded as completed. Similarly another 40 % of these
missing cases were originally right-censored job spells, but job start information of the subsequent
waves suggested that they ended in a new job just after the month in which they were right-censored.
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Table 2
Reason for job end: Shares (only for completed spells that end
before 1998)
west Germany east Germany
Total Men Women Total Men Women
Number of spells 1,927 977 950 1,972 1,103 869
Reason for job end:
Company closed down 0.045 0.041 0.048 0.095 0.092 0.099
End of temporary contract 0.131 0.148 0.114 0.203 0.171 0.243
Dismissal 0.126 0.138 0.114 0.218 0.244 0.184
Quit 0.266 0.253 0.280 0.165 0.182 0.144
Change within company 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.015 0.018 0.010
On leave 0.061 0.017 0.106 0.018 0.012 0.026
Othera 0.107 0.113 0.102 0.096 0.100 0.091
Missing 0.238 0.265 0.209 0.191 0.181 0.203
aIncluding (early) retirement, end of training, end of self-employment and other reasons.
4.2 The speed at which job matches terminate
4.2.1 Hypotheses
Before analyzing the speed at which job matches terminate, first recall the main hy-
potheses. Some are concerned with the east German transition process and some are
general hypotheses. The first hypothesis on the transition process, TR1, is:
New job matches are at a higher risk of being terminated in the east rather than the
west German economy.
The reasons for this are manyfold. Old east German firms with a high need to restruc-
ture are at a much higher risk than west German ones that the entire firm or some of its
activities will turn out to become or remain unprofitable. On average, also new firms in
the east are at a higher risk of failing to remain or become profitable than established
firms in the west. Therefore, the rate of job change and exit into unemployment should
be high in the east relative to the west. Moreover, firms in the east in contrast to the
west are more likely to create temporary jobs.
The extent of public work programs are another reason why temporary jobs were more
frequent in the east than the west German labour market. Jobs in such programs
usually last for one year and were very important for the east but not the west German
economy.20 In east Germany in the year 1992 an average of 388 thousand people were
on such job creation schemes (see Council of Economic Advisors, 2000, Table 24). This
is about 4.7 % of the labour force.21 From the year 1991 to 2000, this percentage was
always above three percent in east Germany, while in west Germany it was below 0.3 %.
Let me turn to the second hypothesis on the transition process, TR2 :
New job matches in the east Germany become less stable over time.
20For a detailed discussion of public work programs in east Germany see Kraus, Puhani, and Steiner
(1998). Such jobs may sometimes last up to 36 months.
21To compute these figures I used labour force data from the Microcensus of the German Federal
Statistical Office.
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The reason for it is the following: At the start in contrast to later stages of the transition
process, the most profitable jobs were created and were matched to the most able
workers. These job matches have the highest probability of survival.
There are general hypotheses for both German regions: The first is the job-specific
capital hypothesis, which I label as G1 :
As job-specific capital is accumulated with tenure the separation rates decline with tenure
(see Farber, 1999).
The firm and the worker, who share the benefits from such capital, have more to lose
from a separation the higher the stock of job-specific capital.
The second general hypothesis stems from the job matching theory, assuming that the
quality of a job match is ex-ante unknown to the employer and employee and has to be
learnt on the job (see Jovanovic, 1979b). Initially when uncertainty about the match
quality is high, transition rates from a new job match into any other exit state are low.
Even if bad signals about the match arrive, it could still turn out to be a very good
match, therefore the reservation match quality is initially low. Yet with every month of
tenure new information about the match quality arrives. As the uncertainty about the
match quality declines, the reservation match quality and thus the separation rate rises.
At some point these separation rates should start to decrease and then become relatively
low and stable, since only the best job matches survive and little new information arrives
that changes the beliefs about the match quality. This line of argument can be applied
to both the worker and the employer and hence to the exit rates into other jobs and
unemployment. I label this second general hypothesis as G2.
Employers cannot freely choose whether or not to dismiss a worker. Protection against
dismissal becomes important when the job lasts for longer than six months (the proba-
tion period).22,23 According to the § 1 of the Protection Against Dismissal Act workers
can be dismissed either if they do not perform their tasks sufficiently well, e.g., due to
illness, misconduct, or a worsening productivity of the worker. Other valid reasons for a
dismissal are related to the situation of the company like a low level of orders or changes
in production techniques. For such company related justifications for dismissals, the
employer has to take into account in particular three social criteria when choosing who
to dismiss: tenure, age and whether workers are obliged to pay maintenance.24,25
If there is no valid justification for a dismissal the work council can oppose the dismissal
or the worker can take his case to the court. If the court declares the dismissal to be
unjustified, the employer has to pay severance pay. The amount of the fine is related to
tenure and age.26 Additionally, the period of notice increases with tenure. Naturally,
22Lampert (1998), pp. 172-174, provides a detailed description of the Protection Against Dismissal
Act (Ku¨ndigungsschutzgesetz) in Germany.
23Until 1998 the law applied to firms with ten or more workers. Since 1999 it applies to firms with
five or more workers.
24Franz (2003), p. 251, emphasizes that such criteria were rather developed in the courts. They
were not the original intention of the Protection Against Dismissal Act.
25On the specific set of criteria that guide such a choice a general agreement between employer and
work council should be reached, see § 95, Industrial Relations Law (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz).
26Severance pay may be up to 12 monthly wages. This upper cap is even 15 monthly wages for
workers who are at least 50 years old with a tenure of more than 14 years. It increases to 18 monthly
wages for workers aged 55 years or more with a tenure of 20 years or more, provided that they have
not reached the retirement age, see § 10, Protection Against Dismissal Act.
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there are exemptions from these rules, as temporary contracts are allowed.27
Hence the more people a worker has to maintain, the older the worker and the higher
tenure the stricter should be protection against dismissal and the lower the exit rates
from a job into unemployment. At around the end of the probation period at six months
of tenure, the transition rates from a job into unemployment should hence be quite high
and then start to decline. This prediction would be in line with hypotheses G1 and
G2.28 It is not any evidence against these two hypotheses. The end of the probation
period is a constraint on the employer’s choice. It forces the employer to take decisions
before this point in time, that may otherwise have taken place later.
4.2.2 Probability of survival
Now turn to the speed of leaving the job. Figure 6 presents life-table estimates of the
survival probability of the job matches in the two German regions by gender. Firstly, it
shows that this probability declines more rapidly in the first 12 to 13 months than later
on. 77 % of the job matches of west German men and women survive the first year;
the east German numbers are four to five percentage points lower. By the end of the
second year the survival probabilities reach 64 % for men and about 62 % for women
in the west. The corresponding numbers for the east are 56 % and 55 %, respectively.
After four years, the west-east gap is lower: 45 % of men and 42 % of women kept their
job in the west and about 39 % of men and 40 % of women in the east.
Figure 6
Survival probability of the job match
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27Over the period under review, the Employment Promotion Act of 1985 and its amendment of the
year 1986 regulated temporary contracts. They were principally allowed. Fixed-term contracts could
be prolonged up to three times. The total duration of such contracts was limited to 24 months, see
Lampert (1998), p. 202., and Franz (2003), p. 219.
28As the reported job duration may be subject to response error, it is not necessarily just before and
at six months of tenure but also in the months that immediately follow, where the empirical separation
rates could be quite high.
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Secondly, Figure 6 shows that a large west-east gap evolves in the 12th and 13th month.
At 11 months of tenure the gap between the west and east German survival probabilities
is about 3.7 percentage points for men and 2.3 percentage points for women. Two
months later the corresponding numbers are 6.2 and 7.2 percentage points, respectively.
This is mainly due to sudden drop in the east German survival probabilities. It reflects,
that among the job matches the share of fixed-term contracts with a time limit of
about one year is higher in east than west Germany. The west-east gap in the survival
probabilities remains high during the second year and the beginning of the third year.
Table 3
Survival probabilities according to year of job start by region and
gender
Jobs starting Jobs starting Jobs starting
from 1990 to 1992 from 1993 to 1997 from 1998 to 2000
95 % conf. 95 % conf. 95 % conf.
Tenure Surv. band Surv. band Surv. band
(months) prob. lower upper prob. lower upper prob. lower upper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Men
west Germany
6 0.856 0.833 0.877 0.887 0.871 0.902 0.903 0.886 0.918
12 0.754 0.726 0.781 0.771 0.749 0.792 0.778 0.752 0.801
24 0.616 0.583 0.648 0.646 0.620 0.671 0.636 0.597 0.672
36 0.524 0.489 0.557 0.539 0.511 0.567 0.599 0.554 0.640
east Germany
6 0.898 0.879 0.915 0.866 0.846 0.883 0.872 0.847 0.893
12 0.755 0.728 0.779 0.705 0.679 0.729 0.684 0.647 0.718
24 0.586 0.554 0.616 0.559 0.530 0.587 0.539 0.493 0.583
36 0.505 0.472 0.537 0.457 0.427 0.486 0.436 0.361 0.508
west-east gapa
6 -0.042 * . 0.022 . 0.032 .
12 0.000 . 0.066 * . 0.094 * .
24 0.031 . 0.087 * . 0.096 * .
36 0.019 . 0.083 * . 0.163 * .
Women
west Germany
6 0.904 0.882 0.921 0.907 0.891 0.920 0.907 0.891 0.921
12 0.757 0.727 0.785 0.770 0.748 0.792 0.786 0.762 0.809
24 0.598 0.563 0.632 0.627 0.600 0.653 0.642 0.603 0.678
36 0.468 0.430 0.504 0.489 0.461 0.518 0.522 0.445 0.593
east Germany
6 0.911 0.890 0.928 0.890 0.870 0.907 0.888 0.861 0.910
12 0.782 0.752 0.808 0.723 0.694 0.749 0.675 0.633 0.713
24 0.626 0.592 0.659 0.542 0.510 0.573 0.515 0.465 0.563
36 0.515 0.479 0.551 0.433 0.400 0.465 0.428 0.346 0.508
west-east gapa
6 -0.007 . 0.017 . 0.019 .
12 -0.024 . 0.048 . 0.111 * .
24 -0.028 . 0.085 * . 0.127 * .
36 -0.048 . 0.056 . 0.094 .
a *: 95 % confidence bands of east and west Germany do not overlap.
Hypothesis TR1, new job matches in the east are less stable than in the west, is con-
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firmed. There is a higher incidence of temporary jobs in east Germany, so that its
labour market is to a larger extent a dual labour market. But job matches that survive
a tenure of 13 months are not much less stable in the east as opposed to the west.
Did job matches also become less stable of over time as suggested by hypothesis TR2?
Table 3 presents life-table estimates of the survival probabilities for jobs starting from
July 1990 to 1992, 1993 to 1997, and 1998 to 2000. They are presented for tenures of
six, 12, 24 and 36 months. The upper panel shows the results for men in the west and
east German labour market as well as the gap between the western and eastern survival
probabilities. According to the first eight rows new jobs in west Germany became more
stable over the three time periods, while the opposite is true for east Germany.
Row nine to 12 of Table 3 show the west-east gap of the survival probabilities for men.
It is never higher than 3.1 percentage points for jobs that started before 1993 (first
column). For jobs starting from 1993 to 1997, the fourth column shows a far larger
west-east gap in the survival probabilities: Already for a tenure of 12 months it is 6.6
percentage points and at 24 and 36 months it is even above eight percentage points.
The asterisk next to the gap indicates that the confidence bands of the east and the
west German survival probabilities have no value in common. This is the case for all
but the first gap in this period. In the final period of 1998 to 2000 the west-east gap is
even higher and at 16.3 percentage points particularly high for a tenure of 36 months.
The second part of Table 3 presents the statistics for women. As for men the stability
of job matches tends to rise over time in the west, but falls in the east. The west-east
gap in the first period is always negative. So, job matches that started early in the
east German transition process were more stable than the western ones. This changes
for the period 1993 to 1997. The west-east gap is always positive and even above eight
percentage points for a tenure of 24 months. It is even higher during the last period.
Hypothesis TR2 is hence confirmed. The stability of east German job matches declined
over time. Only job matches that started between July 1990 and December 1992 in
the east are as stable as those in the west. Thus, job matches that formed early in the
transition process were of a higher quality than those that started later. Now we turn
also to the hypotheses G1 and G2 regarding the job change and unemployment hazards.
4.2.3 Job change rates and exit rates into unemployment
Figure 7 plots life-table estimates of hazard rates into other jobs for men together with
their 95 % confidence bands against tenure.29 It shows three facts. Firstly, there is no
immense and according to the confidence bands no significant difference between the
exit rates in the east and the west. Secondly, as predicted by the matching theory, the
hazards are very low at the job start but rise rapidly from less than 0.2 % in the first
month to a level between 0.75 and 1.25 % at tenures of five up to ten months. In west
Germany a peak is reached during the 11th and 12th month at about 1.6 % and in east
Germany at roughly 1.4 % in the 13th and 14th month. Thirdly, after 14 months the
job change rates range from 0.65 to 0.96 % in the west and 0.46 to 0.77 % in the east.
They tend to be somewhat lower than between four and 14 months of tenure.
29The transition rates in this subsection were estimated using one monthly intervals for the first four
months, intervals of two months length from month five to 16, intervals of a length of four months for
month 17 to 36 and intervals of a length of six months for month 37 to 48. But they always represent
monthly exit probabilities during the chosen interval!
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Figure 7
Transition rates into other jobs - Men
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Figure 8
Transition rates into other jobs - Women
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The results for women are shown in Figure 8. The west German hazard is usually
above the east German one, but the difference is never significant. Overall the slope of
the hazard is similar to that of men in Figure 7: It first rises with tenure and the rise
becomes less strong after four months. The hazard starts to decline to relatively low
levels after the 12th month of tenure. Yet the female hazards in particular in the east
are somewhat lower than the male ones. In contrast to men there is a relatively high
job change rate of west German women in the interval of 31 to 36 months.
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Now turn to the destination unemployment. A large difference between the east and
west German labour market emerges. Figure 9 plots life-table estimates of the unem-
ployment hazard for men in west and east Germany against tenure. The speed at which
job matches end by unemployment is far higher in the east compared with the west.
The exit rate is close to zero in the first month of the job match and rises very rapidly to
its peak in the 4th month at 1.3 % in west Germany and 2.4 % in east Germany. From
five to 12 months the west German hazard falls to about 0.5 %, while the east German
one remains quite high and is more than one percentage point above the west German
hazard. The east German exit rate decreases immensely after a tenure of 14 months.
Thereafter the unemployment hazard is relatively low and stable in both regions. It
ranges for the west from 0.22 to 0.48 percent and for the east from 0.4 to 0.9 %.
Figure 9
Transition rates into unemployment - Men
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The female unemployment hazard is displayed in Figure 10. It rises from nearly zero
in the first month to a peak of 0.8 % in the sixth to eighth month of tenure in west
Germany. During the next eight months it falls by more than 50 %. Finally, from the
15th to the 48th month it ranges from 0.27 and 0.49 %. The east German exit rate
is much less stable and generally higher than the west German one. Already by the
fourth month it reaches 1.6 %. Thereafter, the hazard still tends to rise and peaks at
3.7 % in the interval of 13 to 14 months, where it is about three percentage points above
the western hazard. A very sharp decline to less than one percent follows in the next
interval of 15 to 16 months. The east German hazard then remains relatively stable
ranging from 0.26 to 1.27 % and usually somewhat higher than in the west.
Overall the analysis showed the following. There is no evidence that east German job
matches end more rapidly by a job change than west German ones. Rather the opposite
is true for both gender.30 Even though many new jobs are created in the east German
30Though the single transition rates of east and west Germany were not significantly different, a
log-rank test as well as a likelihood ratio test suggested that the west and east German hazards differ
significantly for both gender. These test results are available on request. For the log-rank test statistic
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Figure 10
Transition rates into unemployment - Women
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economy, a higher competition for vacancies due to the high joblessness makes workers
change their jobs less rapidly than in west Germany. Hypothesis TR1 is hence not
confirmed with respect to the job change rate.
However, the analysis demonstrated that new jobs in the transition economy end far
more rapidly by unemployment than in the developed non-transition country. In a high
unemployment environment, employers more frequently dismiss workers as they can
easily find a replacement. Due to a greater uncertainty about the performance of the
firms that create jobs, jobs matches more often are unprofitable. The immense positive
east-west gap of the unemployment hazard between four and 13 months of tenure is
evidence for this. It also reflects a higher incidence of temporary contracts, partly in
public work programs, in the east as opposed to the west. The east-west gap is positive
even for more than one year of tenure. I.e., the uncertainty about the match quality is
higher than in the west and stays high for longer. Hypothesis TR1 is clearly confirmed.
Is the evidence in line with hypotheses G1 and G2? For the slope of the hazards for west
Germany the answer is “yes”: After an initial rise, the hazard starts to decline with
tenure and then becomes quite stable. This holds for both exit states. But for the east
German unemployment hazard, the answer is rather “no”: The reason is the large drop
of the unemployment hazard after a tenure of 14 months. A reduction in the uncertainty
over the match quality or the accumulation of job specific capital are relatively smooth
processes. Once the remaining job matches are more and more the higher quality ones,
the exit rates should not fall dramatically but smoothly with tenure.
Are the large initial differences between the east and west German unemployment haz-
ard and the substantial decline of the east German unemployment hazard due to a
different share of temporary jobs in the two regions? Are they an outcome of a higher
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980), pp. 17-18, and for the likelihood ratio test statistic see Lawless (1982),
p. 113.
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incidence of jobs in public work programs in the east? With the GSOEP one cannot
precisely determine whether a job spell is due to a public work program: It collects
such information only for respondents who are employed in the interview month and it
is sometimes restricted to particular years and to east Germany only.
Figure 11
Transition rates into unemployment which is not due to the end of a
temporary job - Men
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Figure 12
Transition rates into unemployment which is not due to the end of a
temporary job - Women
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Yet one can determine whether jobs ended due to the termination of a temporary
20
contract in all waves.31 So I define a new destination state: “unemployment that is not
due to the termination of a temporary job”. The resulting unemployment hazards are
shown in Figure 11 for men and Figure 12 for women using the same scale of the axis as
for the previous two figures. As the exit state is limited to subset of the unemployment
exits, the hazards are naturally lower than those of the previous two figures.
For men and women in west Germany the slope of the unemployment hazards differs
little from that in the previous two figures. The striking difference emerges for the east
German hazards. In sharp contrast to the previous figures, the male hazard tends to
decrease relatively smoothly over the interval from five to 14 months. This is in line
with hypotheses G1 and G2. For women the hazard is quite stable in this interval and
there is no immense spike in the 13th to 14th month. Hence, the extremely high exit
rates into unemployment in east Germany for a tenure of five to 14 months as displayed
by Figures 9 and 10 reflect to a large extent the end of temporary contracts.
5 New job matches and their duration: Semi-parametric analysis
5.1 The sample for the semi-parametric analysis and covariates
This section discusses the effects of covariates, which stem from maximising the likeli-
hood of a discrete-time proportional hazards model. Apart from showing which people
exit relatively rapidly from their job match into another or into unemployment, this
analysis is important for a second reason. It shows whether the non-parametric re-
sults were biased towards negative duration dependence due to sorting effects as the
mover-stayer hypothesis of Blumen, Kogen, and McCarthy (1955) suggests.
I control for a limited set of covariates. These are duration intervals, age, marital
status, the location of the childhood (urban or rural area), number of children, whether
an individual lives in a dwelling that is owned by the household and the relationship to
the household head. Additional controls are qualification, as well as labour force status
before the job start (entry state) and the number of job starts in the two years prior to
the start of the current job. The analysis also controls for seasonal effects by dummies
for quarters and for the year of the job start to show whether the job matches become
less stable over time. Regional controls are binary variables for the federal state and the
logarithm of the regional vacancy-unemployment ratio. The latter covariate varies over
federal states and for each calendar month in the period under review.32 Descriptive
statistics on the covariates are displayed in Tables A2 and A3 of the Appendix.
Many job and firm characteristics are not available for job spells that start and end
between two subsequent interviews of the respondent. I only control for industry. If it
is not observable for a job spell, I use the respondent’s last observed industry prior to
this job. For cases where the industry is not determined this way, I use the most recent
industry observation after the job start. To avoid a large number of misclassifications,
I defined only three very broad industry categories.
The number of job starts in the two years prior to the current job start should help to
distinguish between movers and stayers. To compute this covariate, the sample has to
be limited to certain observations: First of all, it is limited to job spells were information
31In all waves of the GSOEP this was an option of the question on the reason for the termination of
a past job.
32The other time-varying covariates are tenure intervals, marital status, number of children, rela-
tionship to the household head, whether the household owns the dwelling and seasonal dummies.
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on the wave prior to the year of their current job start is available. Moreover, only since
1991, east German respondents provide information on job starts that are due to the
first job, a return to an employer, a start of a new employer, within-firm job changes
or due to self-employment. Due to using this covariate and due to missing values of
other covariates more than 40 % of the job spells used in the non-parametric analysis
were discarded.33 This leaves 2,320 west German job spells and 2,089 east German ones
for men. For women the corresponding numbers are 2,376 and 1,766. As before, job
matches that last for longer than 48 months are treated as right-censored.
5.2 Speed of job change
I start the discussion with exits into alternative jobs. The corresponding estimation
results of the proportional hazards model are displayed in Tables 4 and 5 for men and
Table 6 for women. The estimation was carried out separately for jobs in west and east
Germany. I found the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity term to differ signif-
icantly from zero for east German men only. Nevertheless, the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) suggested to prefer the model without such gamma-distributed unob-
served heterogeneity.34 So I present results that stem from maximising the likelihood of
a proportional hazards model which does not control for such unobserved heterogeneity.
The discussion focuses on effects of specific covariates. My main interest is in the base-
line hazard (tenure intervals), age, marital status and children, qualification, previous
labour force status, number of jobs as well as the year dummies. Nearly all of them
are related to the main hypotheses. Other covariates are just viewed as controls; their
hazard ratios are displayed in the Appendix in Table A4 for men and A5 for women.35
5.2.1 Estimation results for men
Table 4 displays results for men. Its first two rows present the constant term and its
antilog, which is the monthly hazard of the reference individual during the first three
months of tenure. The following rows display hazard ratios, i.e., the transition rate
of a specific person relative to that of the reference person. They are shown together
with their t-values, where the null-hypothesis is that the hazard ratio is one, and 95 %
confidence bands. The final rows show the sample size not in terms of spells but in terms
of observed months of the job matches, the pseudo-R2 and the log of the likelihood.
The reference individual’s hazard is 0.11 % for west and 0.43 % for east Germany. The
first set of hazard ratios refer to tenure intervals of the baseline hazard. Most of these
hazard ratios are highly statistically significant. There is clearly an initial rise of the
hazards for men in west Germany. The hazard in the sixth and seventh month of tenure,
when the probation period ends, is four times as high as during the first three months.
33One may argue that past job mobility should not only be measured by the number of job starts in
the last two years. Yet by choosing a three year period, I would have to eliminate all east German job
spells that start at the beginning of the transition process. So, it would be impossible to infer whether
the job matches that formed early in the transition process are the most stable ones.
34For east German men the BIC was 3795.4 for the unobserved heterogeneity model and 3792.6 for
the model without such heterogeneity. The test statistics for the other models are available on request.
35These are ownership of the dwelling, relationship to the household head, industry, seasonal and
federal states dummies as well as the logarithm of the vacancy-unemployment ratio. The final set of
control variables that was used for a specification may be smaller, provided that some potential control
variables were not found to be statistically significant according to likelihood ratio tests.
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Table 4
Estimated hazard ratios for exit into another job - Men (1)a
west Germany east Germany
95 % 95 %
hazard conf. band hazard conf. band
Covariates ratio |t| lower upper ratio |t| lower upper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant term (coeff.) -6.78 14.7 *** -7.68 -5.87 -5.44 11.5 *** -6.37 -4.51
Hazard of the
reference individual 0.0011 . . . 0.0043 . . .
Baseline hazard Ref. group: ≤ 3
(tenure intervals, months)
4 to 5 2.52 3.7 *** 1.55 4.11 2.67 3.3 *** 1.48 4.84
6 to 7 4.01 5.9 *** 2.54 6.35 2.87 3.5 *** 1.58 5.22
8 to 9 2.85 4.1 *** 1.73 4.70 1.92 1.9 * 0.98 3.78
10 to 11 3.25 4.7 *** 1.98 5.33 2.79 3.2 *** 1.49 5.25
12 to 13 4.72 6.5 *** 2.96 7.53 6.17 6.5 *** 3.55 10.73
14 to 18 1.70 2.1 ** 1.04 2.77 2.68 3.4 *** 1.53 4.72
19 to 24 2.30 3.5 *** 1.44 3.67 2.44 3.0 *** 1.37 4.35
25 to 30 1.86 2.4 ** 1.12 3.10 2.20 2.5 ** 1.19 4.08
31 to 36 2.10 2.8 *** 1.25 3.54 2.34 2.6 *** 1.24 4.41
≥ 37 2.46 3.7 *** 1.53 3.96 1.65 1.6 0.88 3.07
Age Ref. group: ≤ 20
21 to 25 3.38 3.3 *** 1.62 7.03 1.34 0.8 0.65 2.78
26 to 30 3.32 3.2 *** 1.59 6.94 0.98 0.1 0.46 2.10
31 to 35 3.04 2.9 *** 1.41 6.52 1.11 0.3 0.51 2.42
36 to 40 2.74 2.5 ** 1.24 6.06 0.94 0.2 0.42 2.10
41 to 45 2.41 2.1 ** 1.05 5.54 0.95 0.1 0.42 2.13
46 to 50 2.50 2.1 ** 1.05 5.95 0.64 1.0 0.27 1.52
> 50 1.17 0.3 0.46 2.99 0.43 1.9 * 0.18 1.01
Marital status Ref. group: Not married
Married 0.89 0.9 0.69 1.14 1.40 1.9 * 0.98 1.98
Children
# of children 0.87 1.4 0.72 1.06 0.75 2.5 ** 0.60 0.94
Children aged 0 to 5 1.16 0.9 0.83 1.61 1.35 1.6 0.92 1.99
Children aged 6 to 10 1.16 0.8 0.80 1.68 1.64 2.6 *** 1.13 2.37
Observations 50,299 40,960
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.0323 0.0421
Log. of the likelihood -2,519.2 -1,652.0
a ∗ 10 % significance level, ∗∗ 5 % significance level, ∗∗∗ 1 % significance level.
In the next four months the hazard ratio is close to three and then peaks at a tenure of
12 to 13 months at more than 4.7. For higher tenures it ranges from 1.7 to 2.5. and is
often considerably lower than for four up to 13 months of tenure. This is in support of
hypotheses G1 and G2. Thus, it is not purely a mover-stayer model that explains the
decline of the empirical hazard, that resulted from the non-parametric analysis.
The results for east German men differ with regard to the slope of the baseline hazard
from those of west German men. Its initial rise is less strong. At four to seven months
of tenure the hazard is about 2.7 to 2.9 times as high as in the first three months. At
12 to 13 months of tenure, the hazard ratio is 6.2 and implies a spike. After a tenure
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of 13 months it is often above two and not generally or substantially lower than for a
tenure between six and 11 months. Only from month 37 onwards this is the case.
I interpret these result as follows: Compared to the west German labour market in the
east German one, at high tenures there is still a relatively high uncertainty about the
match quality. Workers in the transition economy are the ones that have generally less
precise knowledge about outside opportunities and the value of their current job. The
east German results are only weak evidence for the hypotheses G1 and G2.
Controlling for qualifications, age at the job start represents labour market experience.
It reduces the speed of exit into new jobs according to models of on-the-job search
(e.g., see Burdett, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979a). If match quality is (at least partly) known
ex-ante, more experienced workers due to their past job search have already moved into
high quality job matches. So they are less mobile than young workers. Therefore, the
second set of covariates represent age intervals: The reference age is younger than 21.
I chose intervals of five years length for people aged 21 to 50 years. As there are few
job spells of people close to retirement age, one interval ranges from 51 to 65 years.
The results for west and east German males differ considerably. In the west all hazard
ratios except for that of the oldest workers are significant. Workers aged 21 to 25 change
most rapidly their job. Their hazard is 3.4 times as high as for workers who are younger
than 21. Until the interval 41 to 50 years the hazard ratio falls slowly to about 2.5. It
is substantially lower at roughly 1.2 for workers who are older than 50. By and large
western job-to-job mobility decreases with age. The very low hazards of the youngest
workers reflects that they often receive formal and informal training. Before the training
is completed, they have little incentive to change jobs.
Most of the east German hazard ratios differ little from one. The exception are workers
aged 51 at a hazard that is 0.4 times that of the youngest reference workers. In a
transition country age not necessarily measures to what extent people already have
moved to high quality job matches. Many workers gained experience under socialism
and had already moved to high quality job matches. Due to the transition process their
match quality became again uncertain. So, they are more similar to labour market
entrants, who collect new information on alternative job opportunities.
Let me turn to the family context. Being married, the number of children, whether at
least one child is younger than six and at least one child is six to ten years old does not
significantly alter the hazard of west German men. The same is true for being married
in the east, but not for children. I expect the job mobility to decline with the presence
and/or the number of children.36 The results of Table 4 imply that an additional child
decreases the hazard by 25 %. If at least one child is aged six to ten years, the hazard
ratio is 1.6 and highly significant. So holding the number of children constant, fathers
of children at primary school change jobs far more quickly than fathers whose children
are already at secondary school.
Table 5 presents the estimated hazard ratios for a second set of covariates.37 I distin-
guish between four qualification categories. The reference individual is an apprentice or
36There are a number of reason for this. E.g., children make it more costly for the household to
move, so that job offers in other regions are less attractive. A large number of children may reflect a
high preference of parents to stay in a location or that they already work in high quality job matches.
Thus, they are less likely to leave the job than childless people.
37They stem from the same estimation results as the hazard ratios of Table 4.
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already holds an apprenticeship. Relative to them, in west Germany, workers with no
qualification at all or a degree from a special vocational school exit at about the same
rate into an alternative job. Only a university degree implies a significantly higher job
change rate at a hazard ratio is 1.25. Similarly, in the east only the hazard ratio of
workers with a university at 1.35 degree differs significantly from one.
Table 5
Estimated hazard ratios for exit into another job - Men (2)a
west Germany east Germany
95 % 95 %
hazard conf. band hazard conf. band
Covariates ratio |t| lower upper ratio |t| lower upper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Occupational qualification Ref. group: Apprenticeship or apprentice
No qualification 0.98 0.1 0.70 1.38 0.59 1.3 0.26 1.34
Special voc. School
or other training 1.12 0.8 0.86 1.45 1.12 0.7 0.83 1.51
University 1.25 1.7 * 0.97 1.61 1.35 1.7 * 0.95 1.91
Entry state Ref. group: Employment, voc. training
Unemployment 0.92 0.6 0.71 1.20 0.86 1.1 0.66 1.12
Non-participation 0.91 0.6 0.67 1.23 0.44 2.3 ** 0.22 0.88
# of job starts in the two
years prior to the current start Ref. group: none
1 1.33 2.6 *** 1.07 1.65 1.38 2.5 ** 1.08 1.78
2 to 3 2.01 3.6 *** 1.37 2.96 0.94 0.2 0.51 1.73
Job start in year Ref. group: Before 1993
1993 to 1995 1.16 1.0 0.87 1.54 0.70 2.4 ** 0.52 0.94
1996 to 1997 1.02 0.1 0.74 1.39 0.72 1.8 * 0.51 1.03
After 1997 1.12 0.7 0.81 1.55 0.62 2.3 ** 0.42 0.93
a ∗ 10 % significance level, ∗∗ 5 % significance level, ∗∗∗ 1 % significance level.
The entry state does not lead to any significant variation of the job hazards of men
in west but in east Germany. The reference entry state is employed or on vocational
training prior to their current job. The hazard of previously unemployed people does not
differ significantly from that of the reference group. But for previous non-participants
this difference is substantial. Their hazard is 56 % lower than for the reference group.
Finally Table 5 shows hazard ratios with respect to the number of job starts in the two
years prior to the current job start. The reference group are characterised by no such
job start. Compared with them, west German workers with one previous job start exit
at a rate that is 33 % higher. The corresponding number for east German workers is
38 %. Two or more job starts imply at a hazard ratio of two an even higher mobility
in the west. But in east Germany it is below one. Presumably high past job mobility
in east Germany is to a larger extent than in west Germany an outcome of involuntary
job loss. It does not imply that workers are voluntary movers in the east.
Is there a decrease over time in job mobility in the east? The final set of hazard ratios
in Table 5 are concerned with different time periods of the start of the job match. The
reference period is the year 1992. The other periods are 1993 to 1995, 1996 to 1997
and 1998 to 2000. There is little and no significant variation of the west German job
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change rates over time. For east Germany instead, compared with the hazard of 1992,
those of job matches that started in the three later periods are about 28 to 38 % and
significantly lower. At the start of the transition process the knowledge about outside
opportunities and the quality of the job match was less precise than after 1992.
5.2.2 Estimation results for women
The estimation results for the female job hazard are displayed in Table 6. It has the same
structure as the tables for men, but the set of covariates differs.38 According to likeli-
hood ratio tests the controls for location of childhood, children, owner of the dwelling,
number of previous job starts, year of the job start, regional vacancy-unemployment
ratio and federal states are insignificant. So I did not include them in the final model.
The second row of Table 6 shows that the hazard of the reference woman during the
first three months of tenure is 1.2 % in the west and 0.53 % in the east. The following
rows display that in both regions the hazard varies significantly with tenure. It rises
considerably until a tenure of six to seven months, where in the west (east) the hazard
ratio is 2.6 (3.6). The ratio then declines to about 1.5 over the next two tenure intervals.
A spike emerges at a tenure of 12 to 13 months: The hazard is 4.4 times its initial value
in the west and 3.8 times in the east. For higher tenures the ratio is lower and quite
stable ranging from 1.3 (1.4) to 1.9 (1.8) in the west (east). Thus hypotheses G1 and
G2 explain the variation of the job change rate with tenure.
The next rows display the age variation of the hazard, which is significant only in
west Germany. As expected by the on-the-job search models the transition rates tend
to decrease with age. The results for the west imply the highest job change rate for
women younger than 21. The hazard ratio of women aged 21 to 30 years is close to 0.7.
It is already below 0.6 for women aged 31 to 40. Over the next three age intervals it
declines even more rapidly to a level of only 0.12 for women aged 51 to 60. Thus more
experienced workers already moved into high quality job matches, and hence are less
likely than less experienced ones to change their job.
Table 6 shows that married women in the west exit at 0.73 times and in the east at 0.67
the rate of women who are not married. This result is plausible. Married women take
into account their husband’s choices, which may restrict their job mobility. Qualification
is an insignificant determinant of the job hazard in the west, but a significant one in
the east. The hazard ratio of women with a university degree is remarkably high.
Their speed of job change is 2.7 times that of the reference group “apprenticeship or
apprentice”. There is no substantial variation of the job hazard with the entry state.
38In contrast to men a large share of the female job spells are part-time jobs. This is the case for
about 39 % of job spells of women in the west and less than 19 % in the east. In the results that I
present, I did not control whether a women works part-time. One reason for this is that the probability
of working part-time is highly related to the combination of work and family life. Hence the coefficient
of a covariate part-time work could capture partly the effect of children on job duration. I estimated
additionally models including a binary covariate for part-time work. The results suggest for that the
speed of exit of part-time employed women is about 25 % lower for both exit states in west Germany
and also for exit into unemployment in east Germany. Only for the exit rates into new jobs in east
Germany, it has a much lower effect that is not significant. These estimation results are available on
request.
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Table 6
Estimated hazard ratios for exit into another job - Womena
west Germany east Germany
95 % 95 %
hazard conf. band hazard conf. band
Covariates ratio |t| lower upper ratio |t| lower upper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant term (coeff.) -4.43 14.7 *** -5.01 -3.84 -5.25 10.7 *** -6.21 -4.29
Hazard of the
reference individual 0.0120 . . . 0.0053 . . .
Baseline hazard Ref. group: ≤ 3
(tenure intervals, months)
4 to 5 1.94 2.7 *** 1.20 3.15 2.17 2.2 ** 1.08 4.37
6 to 7 2.63 4.1 *** 1.66 4.16 3.59 3.9 *** 1.88 6.85
8 to 9 2.46 3.7 *** 1.52 3.97 2.40 2.4 ** 1.17 4.92
10 to 11 1.53 1.5 0.87 2.69 1.47 0.9 0.64 3.41
12 to 13 4.43 6.6 *** 2.85 6.90 3.82 3.9 *** 1.94 7.52
14 to 18 1.89 2.8 *** 1.20 2.98 1.80 1.7 * 0.91 3.56
19 to 24 1.49 1.6 0.92 2.41 1.42 1.0 0.69 2.96
25 to 30 1.50 1.5 0.89 2.51 1.16 0.4 0.51 2.62
31 to 36 1.63 1.8 * 0.95 2.80 1.53 1.1 0.69 3.38
≥ 37 1.30 1.0 0.78 2.19 1.41 0.9 0.68 2.93
Age Ref. group: ≤ 20
21 to 25 0.68 1.8 * 0.44 1.03 1.43 1.0 0.71 2.89
26 to 30 0.69 1.6 0.44 1.08 0.89 0.3 0.40 2.00
31 to 35 0.58 2.2 ** 0.35 0.93 0.65 1.0 0.27 1.55
36 to 40 0.56 2.2 ** 0.34 0.93 1.04 0.1 0.46 2.39
41 to 45 0.48 2.6 *** 0.27 0.83 0.75 0.6 0.31 1.82
46 to 50 0.36 2.9 *** 0.18 0.71 1.02 0.0 0.42 2.49
> 50 0.12 3.4 *** 0.04 0.40 0.60 1.0 0.22 1.65
Marital status Ref. group: Not married
Married 0.73 2.3 ** 0.56 0.96 0.67 2.0 ** 0.46 0.98
Occupational qualification Ref. group: Apprenticeship or apprentice
No qualification 1.22 1.3 0.91 1.64 0.91 0.2 0.36 2.26
Special voc. School
or other training 1.08 0.6 0.83 1.42 1.04 0.2 0.70 1.54
University 1.29 1.6 0.94 1.77 2.68 4.9 *** 1.81 3.97
Entry state Ref. group: Employment, voc. training
Unemployment 0.78 1.5 0.57 1.07 0.80 1.3 0.57 1.12
Non-participation 0.81 1.8 * 0.63 1.03 1.34 1.3 0.85 2.12
Observations 48,241 35,805
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.0329 0.0510
Log. of the likelihood -2,146.2 -1,054.4
a ∗ 10 % significance level, ∗∗ 5 % significance level, ∗∗∗ 1 % significance level.
5.3 Speed of exit into unemployment
5.3.1 Estimation results for men
Now turn to estimation results for the exit state unemployment for men. For both
regions the hypothesis that the variance of gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity
is zero could not be rejected according to a t-test and the BIC criterion favours models
without such heterogeneity. So I present results from maximising the likelihood of a
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discrete-time proportional hazards model.39
Table 7 presents a first set of results for men.40 Row two shows the reference individual’s
monthly hazard rate. During the first three months on the job it is 0.2 % in west and
0.13 % in east Germany. The hazards vary considerably with tenure. In the fourth and
fifth month, just prior to the end of the probation period, the hazard ratio peaks at 3.2
in west Germany. It then tends to become lower and ranges from 1.7 to two for tenures
of eight to 13 months. For a higher tenure it is always below 1.1 but never lower than
0.65. The evidence is clearly in line with both hypotheses G1 and G2.
Table 7
Estimated hazard ratios for exit into unemployment - Men (1)a
west Germany east Germany
95 % 95 %
hazard conf. band hazard conf. band
Covariates ratio |t| lower upper ratio |t| lower upper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant term (coeff.) -6.23 7.7 *** -7.83 -4.64 -6.61 10.6 *** -7.84 -5.38
Hazard of the
reference individual 0.0020 . . . 0.0013 . . .
Baseline hazard Ref. group: ≤ 3
(tenure intervals, months)
4 to 5 3.18 5.0 *** 2.01 5.03 3.41 7.1 *** 2.43 4.78
6 to 7 2.00 2.6 *** 1.20 3.36 2.90 5.9 *** 2.03 4.14
8 to 9 1.76 2.0 ** 1.02 3.04 2.32 4.3 *** 1.58 3.42
10 to 11 1.95 2.4 ** 1.13 3.37 2.71 5.1 *** 1.84 4.00
12 to 13 1.70 1.7 * 0.94 3.07 4.90 8.7 *** 3.43 7.02
14 to 18 0.82 0.7 0.46 1.48 1.33 1.3 0.88 2.00
19 to 24 0.95 0.2 0.54 1.67 1.44 1.8 * 0.96 2.17
25 to 30 1.07 0.2 0.60 1.93 0.95 0.2 0.57 1.60
31 to 36 0.90 0.3 0.46 1.75 1.07 0.2 0.63 1.83
≥ 37 0.65 1.3 0.33 1.27 0.97 0.1 0.60 1.59
Age Ref. group: ≤ 20
21 to 25 0.56 2.1 ** 0.33 0.96 0.79 1.1 0.51 1.22
26 to 30 0.57 2.0 ** 0.33 0.98 0.77 1.1 0.49 1.22
31 to 35 0.43 2.7 *** 0.24 0.80 0.81 0.9 0.51 1.29
36 to 40 0.67 1.3 0.37 1.23 0.84 0.7 0.52 1.36
41 to 45 0.65 1.3 0.33 1.26 1.05 0.2 0.65 1.70
46 to 50 0.89 0.3 0.44 1.81 1.16 0.6 0.71 1.91
> 50 1.06 0.2 0.56 2.01 1.40 1.4 0.88 2.24
Marital status Ref. group: Not married
Married 0.78 1.7 * 0.58 1.04 0.75 2.6 *** 0.61 0.93
Observations 50,299 40,960
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.0759 0.0914
Log. of the likelihood -1,519.3 -2,700.9
a ∗ 10 % significance level, ∗∗ 5 % significance level, ∗∗∗ 1 % significance level.
Also for east Germany the hazard increases rapidly after the start of the job match.
39In both regions, according to likelihood ratio tests, some covariates have no significant impact on
this transition rate. These were all controls for children and the relationship to the household head.
They were excluded from the final estimation.
40Table A6 of the Appendix presents the estimated hazard ratios of additional control variables.
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The hazard ratio is 3.4 in the fourth and fifth month. In the next six months this ratio
ranges from 2.3 to 2.9. Due to a larger share of temporary jobs in the east as opposed
to the west, in the interval of 12 to 13 months, there is a spike at a hazard ratio of 4.9.
At higher tenures the ratio is far lower and quite stable ranging from about one to 1.4.
Apart from the spike the results are in support of hypotheses G1 and G2.
Only for west Germany the unemployment hazard is significantly related to age and
its variation with age is substantial. At 0.43 to 0.57 the hazard ratios of workers aged
21 to 35 years imply much less mobility than for younger workers. The hazard ratios
tend to rise over the higher age intervals and do not imply that due to protection
against dismissal the job security of workers generally rises in age. Married workers
exit significantly less rapidly into unemployment than others. Their hazard ratio is
0.78 (0.75) in the west (east). One explanation for this is that married people are
more likely than others to maintain other people, so that for them protection against
dismissal is stricter.41
Table 8 presents the estimated hazard ratios for an additional set of covariates. Its first
four rows show that in both regions low skilled workers tend to exit into unemployment
more rapidly than highly skilled workers. In the west workers with no qualification
become unemployed at about 1.4 times the speed of apprentices or workers with an
apprenticeship. There is nearly no difference between the hazard of this latter group and
that of more skilled workers. Not so in east Germany: Workers who went through special
vocational schools exit at only 0.74 times the speed of the apprentices/apprenticeship
group. A university degree implies a hazard ratio that is even lower at 0.43. So high
skills are associated with relatively more job stability than in west Germany.
There is immense variation of the unemployment hazard with the entry state. Em-
ployment or vocational training represent the reference entry state. Unemployment as
an entry state implies a much higher hazard. The hazard ratio is three (two) in the
west (east). Likely reasons for this are that more frequently than others previously
unemployed people are seasonal workers. Additionally, in east Germany they could
also be more often on a temporary job. In the east previous non-participants exit into
unemployment at less than 0.6 times the rate of the reference group.
Table 8 shows that only in west Germany the hazard is positively and significantly
related to the number of previous job starts. For those with one job start in the two
years prior to the current job start, it is 30 % above that of workers with no such
previous job start. It is even more than 85 % higher for workers with two or more
previous job starts.
Let me finally emphasize the effect of the years in which the job started. For the west
German labour market only the hazard ratio of jobs that started between 1996 and
1997 is statistically significant. It implies exit rates that are 43 % lower than for jobs
starting in 1992, when west Germany was in recession. East German jobs starting after
1992 were far less stable than those starting in 1992: The hazard ratio ranges from 1.74
to 2.15 for the three later periods. Thus, job matches that started early in the east
German transition process are of a higher quality than those that started later.
41It is surprising though that in the analysis the number children turned out to be no significant
negative determinant of the unemployment hazard.
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Table 8
Estimated hazard ratios for exit into unemployment - Men (2)a
west Germany east Germany
95 % 95 %
hazard conf. band hazard conf. band
Covariates ratio |t| lower upper ratio |t| lower upper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Occupational qualification Ref. group: Apprenticeship or apprentice
No qualification 1.38 1.8 * 0.97 1.97 1.15 0.8 0.81 1.63
Special voc. School
or other training 1.05 0.3 0.74 1.48 0.74 2.7 *** 0.60 0.92
University 0.97 0.2 0.66 1.41 0.43 4.7 *** 0.30 0.61
Entry state Ref. group: Employment, voc. training
Unemployment 3.12 8.2 *** 2.38 4.10 2.25 8.6 *** 1.87 2.70
Non-participation 0.77 1.1 0.47 1.25 0.57 2.2 ** 0.34 0.95
# of job starts in the two
years prior to the current start Ref. group: none
1 1.30 1.8 * 0.98 1.73 1.09 0.9 0.90 1.32
2 to 3 1.86 2.0 ** 1.02 3.38 1.37 1.3 0.85 2.18
Job start in year Ref. group: Before 1993
1993 to 1995 0.80 1.2 0.54 1.17 1.74 3.5 *** 1.28 2.37
1996 to 1997 0.57 2.6 *** 0.37 0.88 2.15 4.5 *** 1.54 3.00
After 1997 0.75 1.3 0.49 1.16 2.01 3.9 *** 1.42 2.84
a ∗ 10 % significance level, ∗∗ 5 % significance level, ∗∗∗ 1 % significance level.
5.3.2 Estimation results for women
Finally turn to the results for women as displayed by Tables 9 and 10. Only for west
German women I found evidence for unobserved heterogeneity and display its estimated
variance.42 Again some covariates turned out to be insignificant determinants of the
hazards in both regions: These were the industry, seasonal and federal state dummies,
which were not included in the final estimation.
Table 9 displays again the reference individual’s monthly unemployment hazard in the
first three months of tenure.43 It is 0.11 % (0.08 %) in west (east) Germany.44 The
west German exit rates vary remarkably with tenure, but hardly in a way suggested by
hypotheses G1 and G2. In particular, the hazard ratios for more than 19 months are
often above six and above the hazard ratios at tenures lower than 12 months. This is
different for east Germany. There is a large spike in month 12 to 13; the hazard ratio
exceeds 16 reflecting the termination of many temporary contracts. But the hazard
ratios after month 13 are all below 2.7 and some of them are far below those at tenures
of less than 12 months. Apart from the spike, the pattern for east Germany supports
hypotheses G1 and G2.
Table 9 shows no clear age pattern for the west German labour market. Workers aged
31 to 40 years or 46 to 50 years all exit significantly less rapidly into unemployment
42The BIC criterion is clearly in favour of the unobserved heterogeneity model.
43Coefficients of less important control variables are displayed in Table A7 in the Appendix.
44Here, I assume the unobserved heterogeneity term, v, for west German women to be at its expected
value of one.
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Table 9
Estimated hazard ratios for exit into unemployment - Women (1)a
west Germany east Germany
95 % 95 %
hazard conf. band hazard conf. band
Covariates ratio |t| lower upper ratio |t| lower upper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant term (coeff.) -6.78 9.1 *** -8.24 -5.32 -7.12 11.0 *** -8.40 -5.85
Hazard of the
reference individual 0.0011 . . . 0.0008 . . .
Baseline hazard Ref. group: ≤ 3
(tenure intervals, months)
4 to 5 2.43 2.5 ** 1.22 4.84 2.92 4.4 *** 1.82 4.69
6 to 7 5.32 5.0 *** 2.75 10.31 3.68 5.5 *** 2.31 5.85
8 to 9 5.56 4.6 *** 2.68 11.52 3.71 5.4 *** 2.31 5.95
10 to 11 5.66 4.3 *** 2.55 12.58 3.25 4.6 *** 1.97 5.36
12 to 13 8.14 5.0 *** 3.60 18.38 16.06 13.2 *** 10.63 24.27
14 to 18 4.55 3.4 *** 1.90 10.91 2.68 4.0 *** 1.65 4.35
19 to 24 6.20 3.9 *** 2.45 15.70 2.55 3.7 *** 1.55 4.19
25 to 30 6.82 3.6 *** 2.38 19.54 1.54 1.4 0.84 2.81
31 to 36 7.82 3.5 *** 2.45 24.95 2.05 2.4 ** 1.14 3.69
≥ 37 5.30 2.6 *** 1.50 18.77 1.31 0.9 0.71 2.41
Age Ref. group: ≤ 20
21 to 25 0.70 0.9 0.32 1.52 1.10 0.3 0.63 1.95
26 to 30 0.86 0.3 0.37 2.01 1.09 0.3 0.59 1.99
31 to 35 0.34 2.2 ** 0.13 0.90 1.20 0.6 0.63 2.26
36 to 40 0.38 1.9 * 0.14 1.04 1.32 0.9 0.71 2.47
41 to 45 0.69 0.7 0.26 1.84 1.22 0.6 0.65 2.29
46 to 50 0.30 2.0 ** 0.09 0.98 1.79 1.8 * 0.96 3.36
> 50 0.49 1.2 0.15 1.60 2.47 2.9 *** 1.33 4.60
Marital status Ref. group: Not married
Married 0.63 1.8 * 0.38 1.05 1.01 0.1 0.79 1.30
Children
# of children 1.09 0.5 0.77 1.56 1.09 0.9 0.91 1.30
Children aged 0 to 5 0.94 0.2 0.49 1.83 1.68 3.2 *** 1.22 2.31
Children aged 6 to 10 0.85 0.5 0.43 1.67 1.25 1.5 0.93 1.68
Observations 48,241 35,805
McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 . 0.1191
Log. of the likelihood -1,359.6 -2,281.0
σ2v 4.71 *** 2.7 . .
a ∗ 10 % significance level, ∗∗ 5 % significance level, ∗∗∗ 1 % significance level.
than workers younger than 21. The hazard ratios of these three groups range from
about 0.3 to 0.4. For all other age groups, the hazard ratios are also lower but never
significantly lower than one. There is no general decline of the hazards with age.
In east Germany elder women tend to exit significantly more rapidly into unemployment
than those aged less than 21 years. The hazard ratios of women aged 46 to 50 or older
than 50 are 1.8 and 2.5, respectively. One potential reason is that their experience and
skills to a large extent stem from the socialist period. Compared with younger workers
they are more likely to be in low quality job matches or on temporary jobs.
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The results on marital status and children differ between the east and the west. The
hazard ratios in Table 9 show that in the east married and unmarried women exit at
the same speed into unemployment. In the west though the hazard of married women
is 37 % below that of unmarried women. Children instead do not alter significantly the
hazards for women in west but in east Germany. It is not the number of children that
matters but whether at least one child is younger than six. Mothers of such children
exit nearly 70 % faster into unemployment than mothers whose youngest child is older
than ten. A reason is that the value of household production is higher before children
go to school. There is no evidence for stronger protection against dismissal due to
maintenance of dependent children.
Table 10 presents the estimated hazard ratios of the remaining set of covariates. Both
for female workers in the west and east Germany higher skills are associated with less
rapid exit into unemployment. Compared with the reference group “apprentices or
apprenticeship”, in the west, the hazards of less skilled workers are more than twice
as high; those of the categories vocational school and university degree are 0.65 and
0.76 times as high, respectively. But the latter two hazard ratios are not significant.
In east Germany the hazards of the two least skilled groups are almost the same. But
at hazard ratios of 0.61 for special vocational school and 0.53 for university degree the
highly skilled exit far less rapidly into unemployment than the reference skill group.
Table 10
Estimated hazard ratios for exit into unemployment - Women (2)a
west Germany east Germany
95 % 95 %
hazard conf. band hazard conf. band
Covariates ratio |t| lower upper ratio |t| lower upper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Occupational qualification Ref. group: Apprenticeship or apprentice
No qualification 2.08 2.6 *** 1.20 3.61 0.98 0.1 0.64 1.49
Special voc. School
or other training 0.65 1.6 0.39 1.10 0.61 3.9 *** 0.48 0.78
University 0.76 0.8 0.40 1.45 0.52 3.4 *** 0.35 0.76
Entry state Ref. group: Employment, voc. training
Unemployment 5.46 6.0 *** 3.14 9.52 2.36 7.8 *** 1.90 2.92
Non-participation 0.61 1.8 * 0.36 1.05 0.68 1.5 0.41 1.13
# of job starts in the two
years prior to the current start Ref. group: none
1 1.12 0.5 0.70 1.78 1.24 2.0 ** 1.00 1.53
2 to 3 0.90 0.2 0.34 2.39 0.50 1.5 0.21 1.22
Job start in year Ref. group: Before 1993
1993 to 1995 0.63 1.6 0.36 1.13 1.32 1.9 * 0.98 1.78
1996 to 1997 0.77 0.8 0.41 1.45 1.82 3.7 *** 1.32 2.52
After 1997 0.66 1.3 0.36 1.23 1.44 2.1 ** 1.02 2.04
a ∗ 10 % significance level, ∗∗ 5 % significance level, ∗∗∗ 1 % significance level.
As for men the entry state unemployment implies a far higher hazard than the entry
state employment or vocational training. The estimated hazard ratio is about 5.5 for
the west and 2.4 for the east (Table 10). In contrast the hazard ratio for the entry state
non-participation is in both regions below 0.7. There is no overall evidence that the
32
unemployment hazard rises with the number of job starts. Only for east Germany the
hazard ratio for one such job start at 1.2 differs significantly from one.
The estimated hazard ratios for the period of the job start do not differ significantly
from one for the west. Yet for the east all of them do. The hazard of job matches that
started from 1993 onwards are 30 to 80 % above those of job matches that began in
1992. Hence jobs that started early in the transition process are more likely to be the
more profitable jobs with a low probability of job loss.
6 Summary and conclusions
This study contributed to the empirical literature on labour mobility in various ways.
It is the first study that compares the stability of new job matches in east and west
Germany after the start of the transition process and examines in how far the speed of
exit from these job matches is in line with implications of theories of labour mobility. I
find mainly evidence in support of predictions of theories of job-specific capital and of
matching theories that regard match quality as uncertain at the start of a job match:
The non- and semi-parametric analysis showed that the speed of exit into other jobs
and into unemployment increases rapidly during the first months in the job. For the
destination unemployment it is quite high at around six months of tenure, the end of
the probation period. For intermediate values of tenure of four up to 13 or 14 months
the both the job and unemployment hazards are usually relatively high, and sometimes
decreasing. At higher values of tenure the hazards tend to be much lower. Spikes at
around a tenure of close to one year reflect the termination of temporary contracts.
The semi-parametric analysis controlled for different characteristics and in particular for
past job mobility. This analysis showed, that the duration dependence pattern is usually
in line with the predictions of the above mentioned theories of labour mobility. So a
pure mover-stayer model does not explain job-to-job and job-to-unemployment mobility.
Yet there is one exception: The unemployment hazard of west German women, which
remains high even for tenures of more than 13 months. This is the only model, where
considerable evidence for unobserved heterogeneity was found.
The comparison of the east and west German labour market shed some light on the
east German transition process. It is plausible that for a transition economy uncertainty
about the match quality of jobs is higher than in a non-transition economy. In the latter
economy jobs are created to a larger extent by established firms and less by firms that
entered the market only a short time ago or firms that have to restructure. Therefore,
also the likelihood that jobs turn out to be unprofitable is relatively high in the east
rather than the west. The findings support this hypothesis. Non-parametric estimates
of the survival probabilities showed that jobs are much less stable in the environment of
a transition economy. Faster exit into unemployment and not a faster job change rate
in east compared with west Germany account for this. Large gaps between the east and
west German unemployment hazards during the first 14 months of tenure are to some
extent the result of a higher incidence of temporary contracts in the east.
However, for men and women alike, the survival probabilities of new job matches that
formed in the east at the start of the transition process differ only little from those in
the west. Only job matches starting from 1993 onwards are much less stable in east
Germany compared with west Germany. Thus job matches that started in the early
transition process were generally of a higher quality than those starting after 1992.
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For a transition economy one might generally expect that uncertainty about the match
quality decreases less quickly with tenure compared with a non-transition economy.
Hence, the job separation rates at high tenures relative to those at low tenures should
be larger in the transition rather than the non-transition economy. The non- and the
semi-parametric analysis showed however little evidence for this fact. There is some
evidence in favour of this hypothesis for the transition rate into alternative jobs.
The analysis did not focus on economic policy. Nevertheless, there are some conclusions
on labour market policy that may improve the stability of jobs. One important issue is
that small children in the east German labour market, make jobs of women less stable.
A better provision of affordable child care facilities in the east are hence one factor that
could reduce the risk of job loss for these women. Next, there is much less stability of
the jobs of relatively low skilled workers as compared with highly skilled ones. Thus
policies could aim at improving the skills of the low skilled workers in both regions.
Moreover, there is the general issue that jobs in east Germany are much less stable
than in west Germany. Following an argument of Burgess (1999), there are two sides of
this coin. One is that a larger share of jobs of short duration in a labour market where
firms restructure heavily is beneficial for the economy. It eases the necessary labour
reallocation. But also in recent years, new jobs in east Germany are considerably
less stable than in the east German one. Thus, efficiency gains within firms by the
accumulation of job specific capital are lower in the east than in the west. The east
in contrast to the west German labour market shows more features of a dual labour
market. Policies should aim at changing this. A shift from promoting temporary jobs
in public work programs towards policies that aim at a better matching of workers to
jobs is suitable.45 To provide additional incentives for employers to convert temporary
contracts at their end into permanent ones could be a further policy instrument.
Future research with these data should address various issues. The first issue is the
quality of the data. Validation studies should show to what extent job spell data drawn
from the GSOEP are subject to measurement error. Confronting them with data from
social security records should show, whether there is under- or overreporting of job
starts and whether this is specific to certain groups of workers. It should also show
whether there is heaping of the calendar entry and exit months.
The second issue is concerned with the mover-stayer model and duration dependence.
At least for the west German samples, where data over a longer time horizon is available,
future studies could show whether not only the frequency of job starts in the last two
years but also in the less recent past matters in determining the hazard rates. The
resulting duration dependence patterns may then be more in line with predictions of a
pure mover-stayer model and less with the job-specific capital and matching theories.
Another issue of interest are incentives of the unemployment benefit system. With the
GSOEP one could distinguish between individuals who are eligible and those who are
not eligible for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, when they start a job match.
Hence, one could study whether compared with other people those who during the job
match have to gain eligibility to such benefits exit less rapidly into other states and
particular unemployment so long as they are not eligible for UI.
45The recent plans to improve the effectiveness of job centers and in particular to increase their staff
responsible for the mediation are a step in this direction.
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Appendix tables
Table A1
Number of observations underlying the computations of Figures 2 to 5a
Figures 2 and 4 3 and 5
Men Women
west east west east
Year Germany Germany
1991 2,094 1,399 1,373 1,215
1992 2,056 1,174 1,390 977
1993 1,996 1,081 1,354 914
1994 1,941 1,054 1,276 873
1995 1,925 1,051 1,271 889
1996 1,897 998 1,278 852
1997 1,844 964 1,241 846
1998 1,776 907 1,215 810
1999 2,090 999 1,444 872
2000 2,009 961 1,422 828
2001 3,762 1,330 2,713 1,184
a Males aged 16 to 65, females aged 16 to 60
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Table A2
Descriptive statistics of covariates (1)
west Germany east Germany
Men Women Men Women
Covariates Mean Mean Mean Mean
Baseline hazard (months)
≤ 3 0.135 0.145 0.149 0.145
4 to 5 0.081 0.087 0.089 0.088
6 to 7 0.073 0.078 0.079 0.079
8 to 9 0.065 0.071 0.070 0.071
10 to 11 0.060 0.064 0.062 0.064
12 to 13 0.055 0.057 0.056 0.057
14 to 18 0.119 0.120 0.114 0.111
19 to 24 0.119 0.115 0.111 0.108
25 to 30 0.097 0.089 0.088 0.088
31 to 36 0.079 0.070 0.071 0.075
≥ 37 0.116 0.105 0.110 0.114
Personal and household characteristics
Age: ≤ 20 0.048 0.073 0.045 0.078
21 to 25 0.148 0.150 0.135 0.120
26 to 30 0.259 0.198 0.138 0.146
31 to 35 0.202 0.192 0.162 0.168
36 to 40 0.138 0.163 0.148 0.170
41 to 45 0.087 0.115 0.133 0.130
46 to 50 0.051 0.064 0.092 0.098
> 50 0.068 0.043 0.147 0.090
Location of Missing 0.190 0.178 0.076 0.066
childhood: Large City 0.196 0.191 0.166 0.208
Medium-sized city 0.134 0.137 0.186 0.173
Small city 0.190 0.187 0.204 0.195
Countryside 0.289 0.308 0.368 0.358
Married 0.528 0.583 0.664 0.662
Children: # of children 0.668 0.708 0.767 0.765
Children younger than 6 0.225 0.164 0.136 0.118
Children aged 0 to 5 0.159 0.198 0.216 0.223
Children aged 6 to 10 0.434 0.453 0.392 0.396
Occupational qualification, industry
Qualification: No qualification 0.097 0.151 0.037 0.037
Apprentice or apprenticeship 0.415 0.458 0.551 0.530
Special voc. School
or other training 0.205 0.226 0.235 0.265
University 0.240 0.121 0.144 0.123
Industry: Non-service sectors 0.449 0.209 0.553 0.217
Trade/transp./communication 0.179 0.245 0.183 0.219
Other services 0.372 0.545 0.264 0.564
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Table A3
Descriptive statistics of covariates (2)
west Germany east Germany
Men Women Men Women
Covariates Mean Mean Mean Mean
Entry state, number of job starts in the
two years prior to the current job start
Entry Employment/voc. training 0.675 0.543 0.594 0.479
state: Unemployment 0.183 0.143 0.341 0.422
Non-participation 0.142 0.313 0.064 0.099
# of job 0 0.745 0.752 0.702 0.760
starts: 1 0.220 0.213 0.261 0.217
2 to 3 0.034 0.035 0.037 0.022
Season, year of job start,
regional vacancy unemployment ratio, region
Season: First quarter 0.243 0.246 0.237 0.242
Sec. quarter 0.241 0.239 0.238 0.238
Third quarter 0.252 0.249 0.257 0.251
Forth quarter 0.264 0.265 0.268 0.269
Job start 1992 0.163 0.160 0.193 0.212
in year: 1993 to 1995 0.378 0.417 0.408 0.403
1996 to 1997 0.250 0.203 0.214 0.210
After 1997 0.208 0.221 0.185 0.175
ln(vacancy-unemployment ratio) -2.162 -2.149 -3.103 -3.105
SD= 0.456 SD= 0.456 SD= 0.351 SD= 0.346
Region Nordrhein-Westfalen 0.292 0.288 . .
(west): Berlin-west/Hamburg/Bremen 0.056 0.051 . .
Schleswig-Holstein 0.044 0.046 . .
Niedersachsen 0.131 0.118 . .
Hessen 0.083 0.077 . .
Rheinl.-Pfalz, Saarland 0.064 0.068 . .
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.138 0.165 . .
Bayern 0.192 0.187 . .
Region Sachsen . . 0.278 0.296
(east): Berlin-east . . 0.061 0.079
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern . . 0.103 0.113
Brandenburg . . 0.172 0.145
Sachsen-Anhalt . . 0.182 0.192
Thu¨ringen . . 0.205 0.176
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Table A4
Estimated hazard ratios for exit into another job, further control
variables - Mena
west Germany east Germany
95 % 95 %
hazard conf. band hazard conf. band
Covariates ratio |t| lower upper ratio |t| lower upper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Location of Childhood Ref. group: Large city
Missing 1.29 1.5 0.91 1.82 1.13 0.5 0.69 1.85
Medium-sized city 1.12 0.7 0.79 1.58 1.03 0.1 0.70 1.51
Small city 1.08 0.5 0.79 1.48 1.01 0.1 0.70 1.47
Countryside 1.10 0.6 0.82 1.47 0.69 2.1 ** 0.48 0.98
Industry Ref. group: All non-service sectors
Trade/transp./communication 1.30 2.0 ** 1.01 1.66 0.87 0.9 0.63 1.20
Other services 1.00 0.0 0.80 1.24 1.00 0.0 0.75 1.32
Season Ref. group: First quarter
Sec. quarter 0.84 1.4 0.66 1.08 0.66 2.5 ** 0.48 0.91
Third quarter 0.75 2.2 ** 0.59 0.97 0.71 2.2 ** 0.52 0.97
Forth quarter 0.63 3.4 *** 0.49 0.82 0.66 2.6 *** 0.48 0.91
Region (west) Ref. group: Nordrhein-Westfalen
Berlin-west/Hamburg/Bremen 1.31 1.3 0.87 1.97 . . . .
Schleswig-Holstein 1.30 1.2 0.83 2.02 . . . .
Niedersachsen 1.20 1.2 0.88 1.63 . . . .
Hessen 1.06 0.3 0.72 1.54 . . . .
Rheinl.-Pfalz, Saarland 1.14 0.6 0.76 1.71 . . . .
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.89 0.7 0.65 1.24 . . . .
Bayern 1.18 1.2 0.90 1.55 . . . .
Region (east) Ref. group: Sachsen
Berlin-east . . . . 1.63 2.0 ** 1.02 2.60
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern . . . . 1.62 2.4 ** 1.09 2.41
Brandenburg . . . . 1.05 0.3 0.71 1.55
Sachsen-Anhalt . . . . 1.22 1.1 0.85 1.76
Thu¨ringen . . . . 1.23 1.1 0.86 1.75
a ∗ 10 % significance level, ∗∗ 5 % significance level, ∗∗∗ 1 % significance level.
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Table A5
Estimated hazard ratios for exit into another job, further control
variables - Womena
west Germany east Germany
95 % 95 %
hazard conf. band hazard conf. band
Covariates ratio |t| lower upper ratio |t| lower upper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relationship to Ref. group: Household head
household head
Partner 0.82 1.5 0.62 1.07 0.98 0.1 0.69 1.40
Child/other 0.66 2.2 ** 0.45 0.96 0.62 1.6 0.34 1.10
Industry Ref. group: All non-service sectors
Trade/transp./communication 1.02 0.2 0.75 1.39 1.00 0.0 0.64 1.55
Other services 1.05 0.3 0.80 1.36 0.72 1.7 * 0.49 1.06
Season Ref. group: First quarter
Sec. quarter 0.63 3.1 *** 0.47 0.84 0.64 2.0 ** 0.42 0.99
Third quarter 0.85 1.2 0.65 1.11 0.66 2.0 ** 0.44 1.00
Forth quarter 0.68 2.7 *** 0.52 0.90 0.82 1.0 0.56 1.21
a ∗ 10 % significance level, ∗∗ 5 % significance level, ∗∗∗ 1 % significance level.
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Table A6
Estimated hazard ratios for exit into unemployment, further control
variables - Mena
west Germany east Germany
95 % 95 %
hazard conf. band hazard conf. band
Covariates ratio |t| lower upper ratio |t| lower upper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Location of Childhood Ref. group: Large city
Missing 0.92 0.4 0.60 1.42 1.01 0.1 0.69 1.47
Medium-sized city 0.70 1.6 0.44 1.10 0.77 1.6 0.56 1.06
Small city 0.66 2.0 ** 0.44 1.00 1.29 1.8 * 0.98 1.71
Countryside 0.79 1.3 0.55 1.14 1.03 0.2 0.78 1.37
Owner of dwelling 0.77 1.9 * 0.59 1.01 0.77 2.6 *** 0.64 0.94
Industry Ref. group: All non-service sectors
Trade/transp./communication 0.68 2.2 ** 0.48 0.96 0.72 2.4 ** 0.56 0.94
Other services 0.63 3.0 *** 0.47 0.85 1.01 0.1 0.83 1.23
Season Ref. group: First quarter
Sec. quarter 0.89 0.6 0.60 1.32 0.63 3.2 *** 0.47 0.84
Third quarter 0.87 0.7 0.59 1.28 0.83 1.4 0.64 1.08
Forth quarter 1.33 1.8 * 0.97 1.84 1.53 3.7 *** 1.22 1.91
ln(vacancy-unemployment ratio) 0.55 2.1 ** 0.32 0.95 0.69 2.5 ** 0.51 0.93
Region (west) Ref. group: Nordrhein-Westfalen
Berlin-west/Hamburg/Bremen 0.57 1.6 0.28 1.15 . . . .
Schleswig-Holstein 1.86 2.3 ** 1.09 3.19 . . . .
Niedersachsen 1.29 1.2 0.86 1.95 . . . .
Hessen 1.21 0.7 0.71 2.06 . . . .
Rheinl.-Pfalz, Saarland 1.97 2.5 ** 1.16 3.36 . . . .
Baden-Wuerttemberg 1.39 1.2 0.80 2.42 . . . .
Bayern 1.96 2.6 *** 1.18 3.25 . . . .
Region (east) Ref. group: Sachsen
Berlin-east . . . . 0.62 1.9 * 0.39 1.01
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern . . . . 1.14 0.8 0.84 1.54
Brandenburg . . . . 1.06 0.4 0.81 1.39
Sachsen-Anhalt . . . . 1.10 0.7 0.85 1.42
Thu¨ringen . . . . 1.16 1.2 0.91 1.49
a ∗ 10 % significance level, ∗∗ 5 % significance level, ∗∗∗ 1 % significance level.
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Table A7
Estimated hazard ratios for exit into unemployment, further control
variables - Womena
west Germany east Germany
95 % 95 %
hazard conf. band hazard conf. band
Covariates ratio |t| lower upper ratio |t| lower upper
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Location of Childhood Ref. group: Large city
Missing 1.37 0.9 0.69 2.72 1.36 1.4 0.88 2.11
Medium-sized city 0.98 0.1 0.49 1.98 1.36 1.8 * 0.97 1.90
Small city 1.48 1.2 0.79 2.79 1.26 1.4 0.90 1.77
Countryside 1.32 0.9 0.73 2.40 1.72 3.5 *** 1.27 2.32
Owner of dwelling 0.73 1.4 0.47 1.14 0.82 1.9 * 0.67 1.01
Relationship to Ref. group: Household head
household head
Partner 0.92 0.3 0.55 1.54 0.71 3.3 *** 0.57 0.87
Child/other 0.70 1.0 0.35 1.41 0.93 0.3 0.59 1.45
ln(vacancy-unemployment ratio) 0.61 2.4 ** 0.41 0.91 0.87 1.0 0.66 1.16
a ∗ 10 % significance level, ∗∗ 5 % significance level, ∗∗∗ 1 % significance level.
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